ISSN 0317-2473

RESEARCH DISCUSSION PAPER NO. 88

CLASS AND NATION IN COMPARATIVE AND HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE

By

William Johnston*

and

Douglas Baer**

*Department of Sociology
University of Alberta

**Department of Sociology
University of Western Ontario

We wish to thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for providing funding for this research. We also owe a large debt to Michael Jansson for his scrupulous construction of the data file and his knowledge of Swedish society.

Population Research Laboratory
Department of Sociology
University of Alberta

MARCH 1992

92-05222/

Abstract

This paper explores the variation in class consciousness in three Western democracies: Canada, Sweden and the United States. Its main empirical finding is that Swedish levels of working class identification, conflict consciousness and capacity to envisage an alternative form of social organization is considerably higher than its North American counterparts. While this finding is not surprizing to comparative political sociologists, it does provide an occasion for an argument that the differences were basically established in the postwar period and are the product of the different outcomes of the social conflict that surrounded the Great Depression. In its reduced form, our argument is that outcomes of social conflict have had an impact on the distribution of social power and the working classes sense of collective efficacy, which in turn has profoundly influenced the consolidation and extension of class consciousness.

As industrial capitalism proceeded to turn the world upside down it was not surprising that those who witnessed the transformation would think that this epochal change would produce a homogenous world. Thus, we should forgive those early social commentators who imagined 'modern society' could transcend space and time. For them, it must have seemed inevitable that the combined effects of industrialization, urbanization and democratization would result in a 'global village'. Thus notions of a singular end and uniform stages must have seemed compelling to those who witnessed the emergence and proliferation of the dark satanic mills and the faceless masses who were employed in them.

Still it is not only the social commentary of the nineteenth century that can be criticized for advancing what was probably the earliest version of a convergence thesis. Influential sociological perspectives have contributed to the problem by failing to recognize the continued importance of social forms and relations that could codify and sustain uniqueness and difference. Nisbet (1969) identified the blindness of the social evolutionists when he noted that Comte's history was an abstract history, a history divorced from all particularity of events, personages, places and periods. And structural functionalism's concept of modern society is not that different from Comte's eventless history in its insensitivity to the persistence of difference, as is clear from Parson's statement: "There is a convergence of sociocultural development such that nearly all societies reflect to varying degrees the industrial revolution, the democratic revolution, and the educational revolution. It is therefore only a slight exaggeration to say that all contemporary societies are almost modern" (Parsons, 1977, p. 229). When societies are thought to be imperfect realizations of what they all are to become, it is easy to minimize differences as vestigal forms which will soon disappear. Since we are all hurling toward modernity the need to reference residual social forms such as ethnicity, class or religion is not pressing. This type of dismissal is not unique to these two perspectives; the variants of Marxism that have been unable to understand the continued salience of racial, ethnic and national identities erred for similar reasons. A Marxism that focused on the forces / relations couple was just as prone to minimize the importance of these factors as social evolutionism or structural functionalism (Levine and Wright, 1980). Yet, as Zolberg observed: " If Capitalism is all of one piece, why is the working class that it called into life so disparate?" (Zolberg, 1986, p. 397)

This paper explores the issue of the homogenization of modern societies and its effect on working class consciousness by assessing the extent to which national contexts affect processes of class formation and class consciousness. Our central task is to interrogate the variation in class consciousness across democratic capitalist societies. Our core notion is that the nation state provides a framework for establishing the balance of class forces, the pattern of class alliances, and the modalities of class conflict, it will influence the distribution of social power and the outcomes of class conflict. In turn, these outcomes will have an impact on the central aspects of class formation: the organizational strength and the capacity for mobilization of classes. They will thereby facilitate or retard the development of class consciousness. We expect national differences in class consciousness because its emergence and consolidation depends on the historical distribution of social power that is established in the

trajectories of nation states. Since we view class consciousness as embedded in the distribution of social power, we also propose to extend our understanding of it by recognizing that class consciousness has as much to do with power as it does with cognition.

In seeking to register differences and clarify issues relating to the interaction of nation and class the paper will first consider the issue of national differences by examining the literature concerned with 'exceptionalism' and distinctiveness, that is with scholarship that concentrates on the divergences from general social processes. Next, it will discuss class consciousness and the relation of consciousness to action and power. We will pay particular attention to the role of unions and political parties in mobilizing classes. Subsequently we attempt to establish a relationship between contemporary differences in the social weight of the working class and processes of class formation, outcomes of class conflict and the distribution of social power. The differences that we will explain emerge from an analysis of data from a comparative survey of class consciousness that included Canada, the United States and Sweden.

I. National Distinctiveness and American Exceptionalism

The discussion of American exceptionalism has been haunted by an essentialist ghost. This is clear from the assumption that there was only one process to which all others must conform. Thus, particular forms of working class consciousness and action were treated as necessary expressions of the interaction of classes in capitalism. This expectation arose because it was thought that capitalism's objective economic structure was sufficient to ensure the political and ideological homogeneity of the working class. The most notable exception to this expectation was the failure of the United States to develop an independent working class party, unlike all other Western nations. In the context of the exceptionalism debate the issue became: why have American workers not perceived themselves to be a distinctive group with interests at variance with the American socio-economic system? Numerous answers to this question have been provided. They include, among others, social and geographic mobility, the heterogeneity and internal divisions of the working class due to slavery and immigration, the resources and intransigence of the American capitalist class, differences in the political system that mitigated against the emergence of third parties, the absence of a feudal fragment that would have provided an ideational basis for resistance to a thoroughly dominant liberal individualism, the dominance of craft unionism, the emergence of political democracy before industrialization and economic affluence.(Lipset, 1974; Karable, 1979, Shalev and Korpi, 1980). Katznelson (1978) has incorporated many of these in his argument that working class experience in the United States was parcellized and that the resulting fragmentation was never overcome by institutional or cultural mechanisms. Class never became the central axis of social life because its manifest forms remained disconnected. Refering to class formation in the United States he notes: "the links, especially between work and community conflict, have been tenuous. Each dimension of class conflict has its own vocabulary and forms of institutional expression: work - class and unions; and community - class and local parties, churches and voluntary associations ... elsewhere ... parcellization has been offset by competing global institutions and meaning systems of class" (Katznelson, 1978, p. 95).

Canadian distinctiveness has been primarily identified by way of a contrast with the United States (Lipset, 1963). Lipset argues that Canadian political culture developed as a counter-revolutionary response to the American revolution. Here, a timeless essence, political culture, replaces the stages of evolutionism, but apart from the moment of origin there is a similar inability to register the ongoing social processes that create or sustain differences. For Lipset, subsequent history is merely a medium to reflect the origin. Canadian uniqueness, the actual historical development of Canada, is effaced by the notion of a given political culture (Baer et al., 1990). A different explanation of Canadian uniqueness can be found in Ehrenshaft and Armstrong (1981). In this work, the concept of dominion capitalism provides the basis for distinctiveness. Dominion capitalism refers to an economic structure, given certain climatic and demographic conditions, in which rent is the dominant form of surplus extraction. The attributes and contexts of dominion capitalism are: 1) foreign domination via branch plant production, 2) export oriented production, 3) temperate or semi-temperate climate, and 4) low population densities. The non-renewable character of the resources and the boom and bust cycle attached to their development render these nations vulnerable to fluctuations in world commodity markets. Within this general type of economic organization, Canadian distinctiveness is indexed by the failure to elect a national working class government. This failure is attributed to regional cleavages, ethnic heterogeneity, a weak bourgeoisie and the connection to American business unionism. The apocryphal projections for the future that emerge from this analysis suggest some problems, but it does have the virtue of recognizing the unique way in which Canada combines characteristics of the different socio - economic formations.

If the United States and Canada have been characterized by comparatively low levels of class consciousness and mobilization and a singular inability to undertake a sustained challenge to the political dominance of capital, then Sweden is the country that sustains these contrasts. It is clear that this has not always been the case. Pre-industrial Swedish society was extremely underdeveloped, economically, and class relations and class conflict were articulated in a low register (Anderson, 1974). In the nineteenth century, the distinctiveness of class relations was given by a weak bourgeoisie, a powerful independent peasantry, an urban and demographically precarious aristocracy, and massive emigration to the United States (Castles, 1978). It was not until the late nineteenth and early twentieth century that Swedish society witnessed the heightened social and class conflict that had characterized much of Europe and North America. This followed the late and rapid industrialization of 1870-1910 (Jorberg, 1970). Contemporary Sweden is a polar case in cross-national analysis, characterized by dense and powerful trade unions, Social Democratic political dominance and an extensive welfare state.

The exceptionalism literature has made a contribution to our understanding of particular nations because it called for a comparative framework. In that regard, there can be little doubt that a number of the explanatory factors that emerged from it would need to be incorporated in a more dynamic explanation. However, it is possible to identify two important problems with this body of work. First, it has served to reinforce the notion of a general and uniform set of social processes, arguing that these apply in all instances except the current

one. Uniqueness and difference were held to be the exception rather than the rule. More importantly, the explanations were usually structural and therefore static. There was too deterministic a cast to them. Rather than conceiving of outcomes as partially indeterminate and contingent, and rather than thinking of historical processes as open and permeable, they evoked structural factors that eliminated the need for a historical reconstruction that recognized the cumulative effect of outcomes of social conflict on the resources and capacities of classes.

II Class Consciousness

The central focus of the exceptionalism debate was national differences in the level and substance of working class consciousness. While there was a recognition of the specificity of a particular nation, there was nonetheless an implicit endorsement of a formal conception of a pure capitalism, embodying uniform social processes and necessary effects on working class consciousness. Thus, the possibility that the relationship between class structure and class consciousness was mediated by processes of class formation and class conflict was ignored. It is unclear what else one is to make of the various treatments of class consciousness that operate on a purely formal level; best exemplified in Lukacs' distinction between actual and pctential consciousness. In this construction the logic of history would ensure the emergence of true class consciousness because this was the rational response to the development of capitalism everywhere and at all times.

Current analyses of class consciousness remain implicated in this way of understanding working class consciousness in advanced capitalism when they develop explanations, at the level of consciousness, for the failure of the working class to enact a social transformation (Mann, 1973; Giddens 1981). Since the concern is with the failure of the working class to bring about a social transformation, there is a reconstruction of the forms of consciousness that seem to be necessary for rational class action. Thus, members of a class must: (1) see themselves as a member of a class, that is have a class identity; (2) see that class membership implies an opposition of interests between their class and another class or classes; have a conflict consciousness; (3) see this conflict as defining their situation and; (4) envisage an alternative form of social organization; have a revolutionary consciousness. For Giddens and Mann, the analytic problem is to locate blockages to the realization of this sequence. In Mann (1973) class consciousness is confined to a viscious circle because of an inability to conceive of an alternative structure. Changes in consciousness take the form of short, sharp explosions in which working class consciousness moves from identity to totality but regresses in the absence of an alternative vision of social organization. Giddens (1981) agrees with Mann's characterization of working class consciousness, but locates its causes in the different conditions underlying the genesis of revolutionary and conflict consciousness. While it is difficult to object to the formal logic of these sequences, they de-emphasize the complicated, spontaneous and arational bases for class action. Partial apprehensions, fears, intuitions and commitments at the individual level, and deeply ingrained cultural values and norms, such as solidarity and community at the collective level are not seen to be constitutive of action. Rather, the failure is attributed to an inability to conceptualize a new form of social organization In solving

the problem in this manner, these writers loss sight of the interaction between social consciousness and social power. Without entering the debate between methodological individualism and holism (Levine, et al., 1987), our sense is that what social psychologists have learned about the cognitive processes and social learning of individuals is instructive. As Bandura has demonstrated, in order for an individual to function adequately he or she must possess certain competencies and a measure of personal efficacy; perceived efficacy plays a critical role in the emergence of skills and competencies, as well as having a powerful effect on motivation and the mobilization of effort to realize goals (Evans, 1989). The most powerful determinant of efficacy is the success or failure that individuals experience in the performance of tasks. Positive effects emerge from mastery experiences, that is experiences in which individuals are able to successfully cope with the problems and stresses that accompany task fulfillment. Social psychological research has demonstrated that major life events affect psychological well being and that a perceived lack of control over events is associated with demoralization and passivity (Jackson and Tessler, 1984; McLanahan and Sorenson, 1984; Pearlin and Schooler, 1978). While most of this research has only been concerned with individual reactions to stressful life events there is evidence to suggest that it can be extended to the experience of social groups. One only has to examine John Gaventa's (1980) study of Appalachian coal miners to be made aware of the relationship between power and consciousness, and the devastating effect that a lack of efficacy can have on political mobilization.

In an useful extension of the notion of efficacy, points to the way in which an organization or collective enterprise can generate a sense of the mutability of the environment, such that individuals involved in it are less vulnerable to the crippling effects of depression and withdrawal that accompany failed collective action (cf., Evans,1989) . We think that analogous processes are probably relevant to the development of working class consciousness. Indeed, it is our sense that the notion of collective efficacy is critical to an understanding of the dynamics and variability of class consciousness. The major collective organizations of the working class, trade unions and political parties, generate a sense of collective and personal efficacy when they are able to demonstrate the mutability of social and economic policy; this capacity it clearly related to the power, strategy and alliances that these organizations are able to elaborate.

It is undoubtedly necessary to break with an excessively rationalistic and restrictive conception of class consciousness if we are to understand the way in which class affects thought and action. Rather than thinking about class consciousness as something to be understood by way of contrast with some putative rationality or as a series of stages in a predetermined logical pattern, we think that class consciousness develops within social processes implicated in the distribution of social power, the interaction of classes and their organizational and institutional capacities. Seen in this way transformatory consciousness is not a precondition for class action, but a possible outcome of an overdetermined context and processes of class formation. Thus, class consciousness is reversible and discontinuous, not unilinear and homogenous. It is a contingent achievement rather than the expression of historical necessity. Furthermore, this

conceptualization of class consciousness can no longer be the benchmark for comparative studies of working class consciousness. There are simply too many dead ends and cul de sacs indicated by it.

We will be concerned with the assessment of the extent of variation in working class consciousness and the underpinnings of this variability in the degree of collective efficacy and the distribution of class power. In our presentation, working class consciousness is crucially affected by processes of class formation and the distribution of social power within nation states. We expect national differences in class consciousness will be related to differences in the outcomes of processes class formation and also in the degree of empowerment of the working class. Two empowering institutions are trade unions and political parties. Our expectation is that there is a systematic relation between class consciousness and the efficacy and power of working class organizations such as trade unions or left-wing political parties. These organizations enhance personal and collective efficacy and a sense of the possibility of change. In turn, the capacity of working class organizations to effect public policy must be seen as an outcome of class politics. Unfortunately there has been little systematic research into the relationship between power and consciousness in contemporary capitalism that considers the relationship in a historical context.

DATA

The survey data employed in the analysis conducted here constitute representative samples from Canada, Sweden and the United States obtained as part of the comparative Class Structure and Class Consciousness project.[1] In each country, the target population consisted of individuals 18 years or older who were working.[2] The sample sizes were 1498 (United States), 1785 (Canada) and 1145 (Sweden). In each country, we divide employed persons into four class groupings : owners, defined as individuals who are self employed (or partners) ; supervisors, defined as individuals who report "supervising the work of other employees or tell[ing] other employees what work to do"; managers, defined as individuals who report participating in "policy making" at their work place and whose participation is not merely advisory. To be categorized as a manager, an individual had to report making decisions, in at least one of the following areas : a) increasing or decreasing the number of people employed, b) changing the products, program or services delivered by the organization, c) changing the policy regarding work routines or methods of work procedures used in a major part of the organization, d) deciding the overall size of the budget or general policy decisions about the distributions of funds within the budget. Individuals who qualified as both supervisors and managers were categorized as managers. This categorization corresponds with the "ownership" and "organizational assets" dimensions in Wright's most recent typology, but does not incorporate the "skills/credentials' dimension, which represents less in the way of an employees position in the division of labour than it represents the respondents educational background.[3]

Three major constructs are investigated as dependent variables in our analysis: 1) class identification, 2) oppositional or conflict

consciousness, and 3) alternative consciousness. The class identification construct is dealt with first as a dependent variable then briefly, following the literature on class consciousness, as an independent variable in the analysis of determinants of oppositional and alternative consciousness. It was measured as a categorical variable. Respondents were asked, "Do you think of yourself as belonging to a particular social class?" Individuals who answered "yes" were asked to indicate which class they identified with, while individuals who answered "no" or "don't know" were asked, "Many people say they belong to the working class, the middle class or the upper middle class. If you had to make a choice, which class would you say you belong to?" Based on answers to these questions, we classified individuals as primary working class identifiers, secondary working class identifiers, middle class identifiers or "others." Secondary working class identifiers comprised those individuals who initially indicated they did not think of themselves as belonging to a particular social class but, when asked to choose indicated they felt closest to the working class. Because we emphasize working class consciousness, or forms of consciousness that might be considered "anti-system," we did not construct a similar category for secondary middle class identifiers, choosing rather to include these individuals in a residual category ("other") that also included individuals who refused to answer the forced-choice question after initially indicating that they did not see themselves as belonging to a particular class.

The oppositional consciousness construct involves the extent to which individuals identify their interests as antagonistic to the interests of capital, express skepticism about the extant division of power and resources in capitalism, or side with labour in labour-management conflicts. The alternative consciousness construct reaches more deeply, and involves the extent to which individuals conceptualize alternatives to capitalist social organization. The survey items comprising the two continuous variables are detailed in Table 1. Both the standardized the unstandardized "lambda" coefficients in a multiple-group confirmatory factor analysis are shown. The parameter estimates shown in Table 1 represent "common" estimates, derived from a model in which all of the factor loadings are constrained to equality across groups. For the most part, the individual factor loadings estimated uniquely in each of the 12 groups were similar to those found in the common solution reported here.

RESULTS

Table 2 shows differences in levels of class identification, oppositional and alternative consciousness between classes across countries. The number of individuals in the United States who both indicate that they think of themselves as belonging to a social class and identify that class as "working class" is low, even among individuals in the objective working class. Only 4.20 per cent of those in the objective working class are primary working class identifiers. While it is higher in Canada, it is still the case that working class individuals are more likely to categorize themselves as "middle class" than as "working class." Working class identification is highest, and middle class identification is the lowest, in Sweden, where working class individuals are more likely to consider themselves as members of the working class than as members of the middle class. It might be

Table 1

	Factor Loadings	
	Unstandard	Stand-ardized
Oppositional Consciousness		
During a strike, management should be prohibited by law from hiring strikebreakers	1.00*	.358
Imagine that workers in a major industry are out on strike.... Preferred outcome: 1=workers win most import. demands through 4=workers go back to work without winning any of their demands.	.917	.400
Corporations benefit owners at the expense of workers and consumers.	1.490	.616
Big corporations have far too much power in [American][Canadian][Swedith] society today.	1.447	.634
Alternative Consciousness		
In any industrial society it will always be necessary to have a division between those expects who make decisions and people who carry out these decisions.	-.293	.183
It is possible for a modern society to run effectively without the profit motive.	1.00*	.570
If given the chance, the nonmanagement employees at the place where you work could run things effectively without bosses.	.854	.456

* reference indicator

Unless otherwise indicated, responses to these items are scored: 1=strongly agree 2=somewhat agree 3=somewhat disagree 4=strongly disagree

Table 2: Class Identification, Alternative and Oppositional Consciousness in Canada, the United States and Sweden

A: Class Identification (percentages)

Objective Class / Country	N	Subjective Class Identification (%)			
		Primary Working	*Secondary Working*	*Middle*	*Other (none)*
Working Class					
Canada	870	15.52	21.84	29.66	29.63
United States	643	4.20	25.19	32.04	38.57
Sweden	452	25.45	27.54	11.68	35.33
Supervisors					
Canada	252	14.29	23.81	31.35	30.55
United States	291	3.09	26.12	28.52	42.27
Sweden	150	19.33	28.00	14.00	61.33
Managers					
Canada	349	6.30	10.89	44.41	38.40
United States	324	2.72	11.18	43.20	42.90
Sweden	198	12.63	18.18	20.20	48.99
Owners					
Canada	297	11.45	23.23	30.30	35.02
United States	223	2.31	21.76	31.48	44.45
Sweden	121	8.26	27.27	14.88	49.59

B: Oppositional Consciousness (Differences in Factor Means)

	Workers	Supervisors	Managers	Owners
Sweden	.00**	-.273	-.405	-.803
Canada	-.235	-.240	-.495	-.545
U.S.	-.284	-.307	-.481	-.564

C: Alternative Consciousness (Differences in Factor Means)

	Workers	Supervisors	Managers	Owners
Sweden	.00**	-.335	-.299	-.578
Canada	-.252	-.331	-.561	-.691
U.S.	-.356	-.430	-.513	-.610

** reference category
All coefficients in panels B and C are significantly different from zero ($p<.01$).

noted in passing that a non-trivial proportion of supervisors in each of the three countries considered themselves members of the working class; not shown in Table 2, these percentages are 14.29% and 23.81% for primary and secondary working class responses, respectively, in Canada, 3.09% and 26.12% in the U.S., and 19.33 and 28.00% in Sweden. Table 2 also indicates that, while the proportion of workforce members who are in the working class is very similar in Canada and Sweden, a higher percentage of Americans can be found in the supervisory, managerial or ownership categories; this is consistent with the finding that, in relation to other capitalist societies, the U.S. has a larger management cadre (Aherne and Wright, 1983, Black and Myles, 1986 ; Davis 1980).

Levels of oppositional and alternative consciousness between countries and between classes are also compared in Table 2. In the lower portion of this table, *factor means* are contrasted[4]. With respect to oppositional consciousness, the table indicates that the level of oppositional consciousness among workers is higher in Sweden than it is in Canada or the United States. Canada falls between Sweden and the United States in this regard, but the difference between Sweden and Canada is far more pronounced than the difference between Canada and the United States.[5] The between-class differences within Sweden are far more pronounced than the same differences in Canada or the United States. Thus, while Swedish workers have a higher level of oppositional consciousness than American or Canadian workers, Swedish owners are more committed to the present organization of capitalist societies than Canadian or American owners. Differences between Swedish workers and managers or supervisors are also more pronounced than differences between Canadian or American workers and supervisors or managers in the same country. In Canada and the United States, there is very little difference between workers and supervisors (for example, -.235 vs. -.240 in Canada), while in Sweden this difference is substantial (.00 vs. -.273). In both Canada and the United States there are differences between managers and workers (from -.235 vs. -.495 in Canada, and -.284 vs. - .481 in the United States), but these differences are not as large as the worker/manager difference in Sweden.

A similar, although not entirely identical, picture emerges with respect to alternative consciousness. As was the case with oppositional consciousness, between-class differences are more pronounced in Sweden than in Canada or the United States. Between-class differences in Canada also appear to be slightly larger than those in the United States; in Canada, the differences between workers and owners is .439, while in the United States it is .254 (in contrast, this difference in Sweden is .578). There is a small, but statistically significant difference between Canadian and American workers (chi-square = 4.51, df = 1, $p < .0337$): Canadian workers have slightly higher levels of alternative consciousness. There is an even larger difference between Canadian and American workers on one hand, and Swedish workers on the other, with the latter exhibiting a considerably greater degree of alternative consciousness. With one minor exception, supervisors and managers stand somewhere between workers at one extreme and owners at the other, with supervisors being located closer to workers than managers; this is the case for both oppositional and alternative consciousness. The one exception is in alternative consciousness in Sweden where the ordering of managers and supervisors is reversed. A

rather similar pattern obtains even when one controls for between-class differences in income, education and age; these results are not reported in Table 2, but it might be noted that most of the mean difference coefficients changed by less than .05, and that the largest change was only .1.

Across all classes and across all countries, there is a fairly strong correlation between oppositional and alternative consciousness, as can be seen in Table 3. In the case of the working class, though, it might be noted that this association is somewhat stronger in Sweden (covariance of .292, correlation of .780) than it is in Canada or the United States (covariances of .090 and .081, correlations of .532 and .500 respectively). Strictly speaking, covariances are preferred for purposes of comparison, since the variances of the constructs differ across sub-populations. There is, for example, somewhat more variability among Swedish workers than there is among Canadian or American workers.

The connection between class identification and class consciousness in the American, Canadian and Swedish working class is presented in Table 4. The two class consciousness constructs formed the dependent variables in this analysis, while a series of dummy variables represented the class identification measure. As discussed earlier, the variable itself was measured with four categories: 1) working class identification, 2) secondary working class identification, 3) middle class identification, and 4) no class ID (mostly refusals to identify with any class). The secondary working class category consisted of individuals who initially indicated that they did not think in class terms or whom initially refused to identify with a particular class, but when pressed to make a decision as to which class they felt closer to chose the "working class." Three dummy variables were constructed; the "other" category acted as the reference group. These dummy variables were entered into the analysis as single-indicator ksi-variables; the gamma matrix coefficients connecting these variables to the two constructs are directly analogous to unstandardized regression coefficients in dummy variable regression analyses.

For both the opposition and alternative construct, working class identification has a much greater impact in Sweden than it does in Canada or the United States. In all countries, the differences between individuals who identify themselves as part of the "middle class" and those who have no class identification tend to be negligible. In Table 4, differences between Canadians and Americans in terms of the impact of class identification on class consciousness are difficult to detect. The impact of working class identification on oppositional consciousness is statistically significant for Canadian workers but not for U.S. workers, but the coefficients are similar. The U.S. coefficient (+.125) is not statistically significant, but differences in the results of significance tests between the two countries is more likely to be a function of sample size (very few U.S. workers spontaneously identified with the working class, as shown in Table 2), rather than real Canada-U.S. differences in the connection between class identification and class consciousness. Differences in oppositional consciousness may arise from differences in rates of class identification, to be sure, but class identification per se does not appear to have more of an association with alternative or oppositional consciousness in Canada than it does in the United States.

Table 3

Relationship between Opposition and Alternative Consciousness

	Variances: Oppos.	Alter.	Covariance between Opp & Alt.	Correlation
Swedish Workers	.210 (1.324)	.667 (1.949)	.292 (1.254)	.780
Swedish Managers	.317 (1.999)	.598 (1.747)	.329 (1.411)	.756
Swedish Super.	.248 (1.564)	.649 (1.894)	.310 (1.333)	.773
Swedish Owners	.259 (1.635)	.282 (.824)	.168 (.720)	.622
Canadian Workers	.100 (.632)	.286 (.837)	.090 (.385)	.532
Canadian Managers	.201 (1.268)	.301 (.878)	.171 (.733)	.695
Canadian Super.	.095 (.598)	.171 (.499)	.091 (.393)	.714
Canadian Owners	.105 (.659)	.243 (.708)	.120 (.514)	.751
U.S. Workers	.118 (.745)	.222 (.648)	.081 (.348)	.500
U.S. Managers	.196 (1.234)	.299 (.874)	.147 (.630)	.607
U.S. Super.	.096 (.603)	.163 (.476)	.103 (.440)	.823
U.S. Owners	.218 (1.374)	.253 (.738)	.189 (.813)	.804

* Numbers in brackets refer to a between-groups standardized values. The weighted between-group variances will sum to 1.0 across all groups.

Table 4

Relationship Between Class Identification and Opposition/Alternative Consciousness
(Unstandardized Gamma Matrix Elements)

Dependent Variable: Opposition

	Class Identification:		
	Working Class		*Middle*
	Primary	*Secondary*	*Class*
Swedish Workers	+.516**	+.305**	+.041
Swedish Super.	+.537*	+.258**	+.121
Swedish Managers	+.712**	+.471**	+.161
Swedish Owners	+.850**	+.314*	+.257
Canadian Workers	+.181**	+.154**	+.026
Canadian Super.	+.121	+.109	-.031
Canadian Managers	+.377**	+.148	+.138*
Canadian Owners	+.285*	+.104	+.124
U.S. Workers	+.125	+.128*	+.023
U.S. Super.	+.162	+.128	+.040
U.S. Managers	+.595*	+.436**	+.214*
U.S. Owners	+.123	+.126	-.110

Dependent Variable: Alternative

Swedish Workers	+.523**	+.296*	-.048
Swedish Super.	+.556*	-.051	-.079
Swedish Managers	+.624*	+.337	+.380
Swedish Owners	+.629*	-.081	-.236
Canadian Workers	+.185*	+.025	-.018
Canadian Super.	+.012	+.118	+.102
Canadian Managers	+.024	+.067	+.040
Canadian Owners	-.090	+.046	-.258*
U.S. Workers	-.159	+.127	+.078
U.S. Super.	+.311*	+.164	+.016
U.S. Managers	+.694*	+.137	-.011
U.S. Owners	-.128	+.028	-.328*

* p<.05 ** p<.001

Labour union membership, and support for political parties associated with the labour movement, constitute two powerful organizing forces through which working class consciousness, and opposition to capitalism, can be established and sustained. But the institutional structures associated with each of these two factors are markedly different across countries, and it remains to be seen whether, as we might expect, labour unions and political parties have a stronger influence on workers' attitudes in Sweden than in the United States, and where Canada stands in relation to these two countries. In Canada, the New Democratic Party is coded as the left political party, while in Sweden, support for the Social Democratic Party or S.A.P. party is coded as left. There is really no left political party in the United States, unless one categorizes the moderate centrist role that the Democratic party plays in relation to the right-wing Republican party as left. This was done in the analysis reported here, with the expectation that the impact of the Democratic party in the U.S. would be negligible in relation to the NDP in Canada or S.A.P. in Sweden.

Table 5 shows the effect of union membership, and of left political party support, on class identification, oppositional and alternative consciousness in an analysis of individuals in the objective working class. For each of these variables, the effects of age, income and education have been adjusted for.[6] The effect of union membership on oppositional consciousness is similar in all three countries, although stronger in Sweden. For alternative consciousness, though, the strong effect noted in Sweden can be contrasted with a negligible effect in Canada and the United States. And union membership has little discernible effect on working class identification in Canada, a modest effect in the United States, and a fairly strong effect in Sweden.

A similar pattern emerges with respect to political party support, although here the coefficient for the left party support on oppositional consciousness in Sweden is over twice as large as the coefficients for Canada and the United States. And there is a very pronounced effect, representing the movement of about three-quarters of a unit in indicator variables having scales that only range from 1 to 4 (i.e., three units), of left party support on alternative consciousness in Sweden in contrast to a zero coefficient in the United States and a relatively low coefficient (not significantly different from zero) in Canada. The association between left party support and working class identification in Sweden is very strong; in contrast, it is negligible in Canada or the United States. The fact that NDP in Canada has no more of an effect on working class consciousness than the Democratic party in the United States must come as a surprise to those who would contend that the more labour-based NDP has a substantial impact on class consciouness in Canada. There is little evidence for such an effect within the working class.

In the analysis reported in Table 5, age, income and education are controlled for as the effects of union membership and left party support are assessed. In Table 6, the effects of these three variables are assessed in a model that does not incorporate union membership or left party support, providing a general picture of the extent to which the working class is stratified in terms of background and socio-economic status differences[7]. Across all three countries, education has a consistently conservatizing influence upon the working class. Across

Table 5

Effect of Union Membership and Left Party Support on Identification, Oppositional and Alternative Consciousness

	Opposition	Altern.	Working Class ID Primary	Pri/sec.
	Gamma	Gamma	Log odds (odds)	Log odds (odds)
Sweden				
Union membership	.297**	.447**	1.027** (2.800)	1.220** (3.386)
Left party support	.530**	.754**	2.085** (8.045)	1.733** (5.656)
Canada				
Union membership	.167**	.095	.1054 (1.111)	-.0433 (.958)
Left party support	.204**	.123	.2397 (1.271)	-.0141 (.986)
U.S.A.				
Union membership	.180**	.070	.9898* (2.690)	.7640** (2.147)
Left party support	.144*	.000	-.0040 (.996)	.2397 (1.271)

* p<.05
** p<.01

Controls: age, education, income.

Table 6

Effect of Age, Income and Education on Identification, Opposition and Alternative Consciousness

	Opposition Gamma Pri./sec. (standardized in brackets)	Altern. Gamma (std. (odds)	Working Class ID Primary Log odds (odds)	Log odds (odds)
Sweden				
Age	+.032 (.063)	-.006 (-.009)	-.0856 (.918)	-.0567 (.945)
Income	-.122 * (.126)	-.311 ** (-.186)	-.5117* (.560)	-.5537* (.575)
Education	-.033 * (-.172)	+.009 (+.026)	-.3216** (.732)	-.4218** (.662)
Canada				
Age	-.013 (-.052)	-.074 ** (-.177)	-.2522** (.777)	-.0856 (.918)
Income	-.024 (-.055)	+.009 (+.012)	-.1732 (.841)	-.2058 (.814)
Education	-.010 * (-.107)	-.023 (-.146)	-.1367** (.872)	-.1487** (.861)
U.S.A.				
Age	-.040 * (-.161)	-.108 * (-.323)	-.0902 (.914)	-.0654 (.937)
Income	+.034 (.068)	-.044 (.065)	+.0033 (1.003)	-.2373 (.789)
Education	-.027 ** (-.190)	-.056 ** (-.290)	-.0612 (.941)	-.1731 (.841)

* p <.05
** p<.01

three dependent variables and three countries, there are only two exceptions to this pattern: education does not have a significant effect upon alternative consciousness in Sweden, and it does not have a significant effect upon working class identification in the United States. With respect to working class identification in the United States, it should be noted that the level of working class identification is extremely low, so there is very little in the way of differences between workers to be explained in any analysis of this sort.

Oppositional and alternative attitudes are not differentially distributed according to age in Sweden, but in the United States older workers display less oppositional and less alternative consciousness. In Canada, this effect is considerably less pronounced, and applies mostly to alternative consciousness. Finally, working class attitudes are not differentially distributed according to income in either Canada or the United States, suggesting that a mechanical connection between workers' positions in the reward hierarchy and attitudes concerning capitalism does not exist in these two countries. This might be contrasted with Sweden, where higher income workers display less oppositional and less alternative consciousness, and a lower probability of identifying themselves as "working class".

DISCUSSION

It is our contention that these national differences are primarily a function of the differential empowerment of the working class in the nations involved in the comparison. Fortunately, some recent studies provide us with the some evidence to measure the differential empowerment of the working class (Bain, 1980; Cameron, 1984; Griffin et al, 1989; Korpi, 1983; Esping-Andersen, 1985, 1989; and Castles, 1978). While much of this material focuses on variation in the provision of welfare services, we think that it is pertinent to our problem of understanding differences in class consciousness. Tables 8 and 9 contain a number of indices of working class economic and political power. The logic behind the employment of these particular measures is that working class power is based on the unity of electoral numbers and the strength of the economic institutions involved in collective bargaining. It would follow that levels of trade union density and the share of the vote going to working class parties would effect the capacity of working class organizations to mobilize these power resources in pursuit of working class interests and the realization of social policies that tendentially favour the working class in the democratic class struggle.

Swedish levels of working class power have, historically, been significantly greater than those of their North American counterparts. It is clear that the differences became pronounced in the post World War I period. This tends to confirm Sean Wilnetz's (1984) generalization that before 1920 the social, political and ideological history of the labour movement in the United States was not very different from that of other labour movements. This conclusion was based on the research of a new generation of labour historians and was directed against notions of American exceptionalism. In terms of the levels of union density, the period between 1920 and 1940 was crucial. In this period the level of union density doubled in Sweden, while the joint effect of the 20s and the depression left labour in North America at its 1920 level. This was

also the period during which Swedish working class parties almost quadrupled their percentage of the popular vote, coming close to a majority, at a time when the right wing vote was distributed among three political parties. While there is undoubtedly a reciprocal interaction between union strength and left wing vote, we are inclined to think that the absence of a successful employers offensive in Sweden owed much to the political strength of organized labour. This contrasts sharply with the situation in Canada or the United States (Galenson, 1986; Abella, 1974). In other words, it was working class political power that served to create the conditions that were necessary to maintain and enhance the economic organization of the working class. We are inclined to accept the judgement that it was the coupling of the political strength of the working class with the fragmentation of the right, rather than any cultural predisposition to compromise, that was decisive in the elaboration of the welfare state and the institutional completeness of the movement in Sweden (Weir and Skocpol, 1985; Castles, 1978).

While there are several interesting subtexts in these findings, it is clear that our principal explanandum is the difference in class consciousness between Sweden and either Canada or the United States. In contrast with their Canadian and American counterparts, Swedish workers display levels of class identification, class opposition and trasformatory consciousness that are significantly higher. While this result was not unexpected, it can be noted that the earliest comparative national surveys reported different findings. Center's study of the psychology of social classes compared Swedish and American levels of class identification and found little difference, except in the number of "don't knows" in Sweden. This lead him to infer that" ...class consciousness is actually less definite in Sweden than in the United States" (Centers, 1961, p. 221). Buchanan (1953) found broadly similar levels of self identified class in all countries and noted that the United States had lower levels of middle class identifiers than most nations. While we would not make too much of these findings, they could sensitize us to the importance of the post depression eras in consolidating and extending national differences in class consciousness. No less an authority than Walter Korpi (1978) has argued persuasively that the organizational basis for the Swedish working class to act as a class for itself was realized only in the post-war period.

The contemporary Swedish working class has consolidated and extended the differences between itself and its North American counterparts. Of particular note is the degree to which Social Democratic governments have managed to reduce the role of the market in income determination. Forty one percent of the compensation that individuals in Sweden receive is beyond the scope of the cash nexus. As Esping-Andersen (1985) has argued, the limitation of market forms of compensation and the extension of the welfare state has the effect of overcoming the stratification and atomization of the working class. At the same time this removes the uncertainties associated with a pure market economy and reduces the dependency of the working class on a system propelled by private investment. Apart from the obvious differences between Sweden and the other nations, we are struck by the limited differentiation between Canada and the United States. Shalev and Korpi (1980) place Canada and the United States in a category that is defined by low levels of union density and an absence of power in

national political decision-making. In a separate analysis of the period between 1946 and 1976, Korpi (1983) places the two countries in a category defined by low levels of working class mobilization and exclusion from national political power. As Tables 7 and 8 indicate there were, until very recently, modest differences in the level of union density and in the extent to which the market had been superseded as a source of income, but similar levels of labour unity. Still it should be recognized that where there are differences they point to higher levels of class consciousness in Canada. Part of the reason for this is that the exclusive focus on control over the national government serves to obscure an important difference at the subaltern level of the respective federal systems, where a labour-supported party, the N.D.P., has held office in Canada.

In demonstrating a clear correspondence between the power of the working class and class consciousness, we have treated the various manifestations of power as givens. Of course, over time, they are not. At one level, they are the product of decades of efforts by ordinary people to elaborate collective organizations that will serve their interests and fulfill their aspirations. At another, they are outcomes of a series of extensive popular mobilizations and protracted struggles that mock the core assumptions of rational choice models of human behaviour. Our contention is that the differential empowerments of the working class at particular times and places can be understood as outcomes of struggles that pitted the organizational strength and strategy of the contending forces against each other. Differences between nations in the relative empowerment of the working class reflect the cumulative weight of these outcomes of conflict and struggle in those critical periods that establish a durable pattern.

It needs to be acknowledged that there is nothing inevitable about each resolution. While it is undoubtedly true that the cumulative weight of the past places limits on the variation in the present, we need to recognize a measure of indeterminacy and play in each strategic situation, such that no straightforward extrapolation from the past is possible. This is not only because we need to consider the possible strategic options, but also the way in which subsequent contexts will have an impact on the power and organizational capacities of the collective actors involved in social conflict. By this we refer to long term structural transformations of the labor process, changes in corporate and managerial organization, alterations in the sectoral distribution of employment and other ongoing social processes that can, at some point, reach a threshold which can be expected to alter any given balance of power. The terrain of class conflict is, in other words, always shifting.

In stressing the historical character of empowerment, we are simply attempting to redress the balance between structural and historical explanations for national differences. Clearly there are structural, as well as historical, attributes of the Swedish working class that, on balance, facilitate the emergence of solidarity and of powerful working class organizations. Of special importance would be the absence of religious, ethnic, ideological or regional cleavages and the way in which the late and rapid industrialization favoured industrial rather than craft unions (Korpi, 1978). Yet, it is to the historical outcomes of conflict that we look when we try to come to grips with the differences that we observe regarding both class consciousness and

Table 7

Indices of Working Class Economic and Political Power

Year	Density			Left Vote (%)		
	Sweden	Canada	U.S.	Sweden	Canada	U.S.
1890*	.7					
1900*	4.8		5.5			
1910-11*	8.1	4.7#	9.0			
Pre WWI**				13	0	4
1920-21*	27.7	15.0	16.7			
1930-31*	36.0	13.5	8.9			
Interwar**				46	3	5
1940-41*	54.0	18.3	16.4			
1946-60**				52	13	1
1950-51*	67.7	32.8	28.0			
1960-61*	73.0	34.5	27.1			
1961-80**				51	17	0
1970-71*	80.4	34.7	27.1			

* Korpi, *Democratic Class Struggle*, p .38.
** Bain, *Profiles of Union Growth*, pp. 88-89, 107-108, 142-143.

percentage of total labour force

Table 8
Measures of Working Class Power, 1965-82.

	Power of working class, 1965-82.		
	Sweden	Canada	United States
Control of the national government by left parties**	65	0	0
Unity of labour**	80	40	40
Centralized power of trade union centre **	70	0	0
Per cent unionized **	70	27	21
Market compensation as a percentage of total compensation *	59	68	71

* Griffin, *National Variations in the Context of Struggle*, page 41, based on period 1975-1980.

** Cameron, *Social Democracy, Corporatism, and the Representation of Economic Interests in Advanced Capitalist Society*, page 160-165.

power. This is because structural explanations cannot account for national variation over time, and because we need to stress the fact that structural attributes of collective actors are only significant to the extent that they have an impact on class capacities and power and therefore outcomes of conflict.

Since a history of class conflict in each country is well beyond the scope of this paper, we will undertake an brief assessment of a crucial period of class conflict to make the argument that outcomes are central to an understanding of the differences in the relative weight of the working class. Thus, we will examine the manner in which the outcome of events between 1920 and 1940 had an impact on the focal organizations of the working class in each country and consider how the variegated outcomes enhance our understanding of national differences. The relational nature of power should dictate that the power of the right be included in our analysis, but considerations of space and the absence of readily available measures of the power of capital render this impossible. However since the outcomes of economic and social conflict reflect, in good measure, the relative power of the contending social forces this absence is less crucial than it might initially appear.

The selection of this period is not simply random. For one thing, it was characterized by intense social conflict and some basic realignments in social and political power. For another there was a broad comparability among the nations in their levels of working class power at the outset of the period. The differences in the organizational strength of labour in the three countries in 1920 were not large and the labour movement in each country suffered a common fate in the early 1920s. In this period, the labour movements in all three countries suffered a sharp reversal in fortunes. Thompson (1985) has pointed to the disastrous impact of these years on the Canadian economy and Abella (1974) has testified to their negative impact on the trade union movement. Parallel processes occurred in both Sweden and the United States in the aftermath of World War I and the climax of the global labour insurgency that peaked in the years 1919-1921 (Kealey, 1984). Differences arose in the latter half of this decade when the Swedish trade union movement managed to reverse the decline, while in North America stagnation or hemorrhage continued to be the rule. Thus the 1920s seriously weakened organized labour in North America and largely eradicated its indigenous traditions of radicalism (Abella, 1973; Davis, 1986; Palmer, 1983). This was not the case in Sweden, where in the latter half of the decade the trade union movement extended its arc as the Social Democratic Party approached a majority of the popular vote. Indeed, they soon reached the point, at about forty percent of voter support, which placed them in a pre-eminent position in Swedish politics (Castles, 1978).

The Swedish working class entered the 1930s with more resources and greater organizational capacities. It should be pointed out that this was not the product of a grand accommodation with capital, for until the late 1930s Sweden lead the world in days lost in strikes and lockouts. Indeed the 1930s began with fierce labour battles, many taking the form of lockouts (Korpi, 1982). It was not until 1938 that the "great compromise" arising from the Saltsjobaden agreement was established. Thus, when the Great Depression swept the Western industrial democracies, the Swedish working class was well placed to take advantage of the potential inherent in the new strategic context.

In their case, the new possibility was an alliance with an Agrarian party whose supporters were traumatized by the loss of German and British markets and the precipitous fall in agricultural prices (Weir and Skocpol, 1985). The traditional opposition between Agrarians and Social Democrats was overcome and an accommodation on a program of agricultural price supports and deficit financing of public works at union rates was reached (Soderpalm, 1979; Castles, 1978). So began forty years of virtually uninterrupted Social Democratic political power that consolidated the position of the working class in the economy and polity.

It was not to be this way elsewhere. In the United States, the hardest hit of the major industrialized nations, a national macro-economic recovery strategy was not implemented until the very late 1930s (Weir and Skocpol, 1985). The confluence of a severe depression and the failure of the New Deal to substantially ameliorate its economic impact, while at the same time facilitating union organization through the NIRA and latter the Wagner Act, triggered massive waves of working class militancy. Davis (1980) has identified the period as the high water mark of class struggle in the United States. Still we need to be sensitive to the fact that the most important of these developments occurred late in the depression and it was not until the election of 1936 that the class issue dominated the national political agenda. As Galenson (1986) recognized, Roosevelt owed nothing to organized labour after the 1932 election. What is true and important, is that the 1936 realignment represented a coalition of second generation workers, negroes, urban political machines, farmers and a block of native protestant workers that bore more than a passing resemblance to the farmer-worker coalition that was so successful in Sweden. But, two differences seem important. First, neither farmers nor workers had independent political representation; rather, they were important elements in a party that encompassed a much broader array of social forces. Indeed, Ferguson (1984) has argued that the social forces at the center of this coalition was neither labour nor farmer, but rather a new historic bloc of capital-intensive industries, investment banks and internationally oriented commercial banks. Second, the dominant bloc with the farm interest were large wheat, corn and cotton producers who benefitted from the early New Deal and had no acknowledged interest in pushing the New Deal further to the left (Weir and Skocpol, 1985).

In the economic arena there were substantial gains for trade unions during the periodic upsurges but the industrial organizing drives of the CIO ground to a halt in the latter half of 1937 (Davis, 1980). It was only during War World II that militancy in the defence industries restored the momentum of industrial unionism that had been lost near the end of the depression. Even so, industrial unionism remained a minority tendency within the organized labour movement. At the time of reunification of the AFL and CIO in 1955, the apex of union power in the United States, the AFL was twice as large as the CIO (Galenson, 1986). If the outcome of the depression was unambiguously positive for the Swedish working class this was not clear in the United States. Significant advances were registered; these would provide the basis for the expansions of the 40s and early 50s, but the working class was never unified at the political or economic level (Davis, 1980; Levine, 1988).

Given the high degree of interpenetration of the Canadian / American economies and the organic connection between their respective

trade union movements it should not come as a surprize that the two movements folowed similar paths in the 1930s. The principal differences were the late emergence and comparative weakness of the industrial union movement in Canada. In almost all aspects, the negative effects of the depression were more pronounced and the response of Canadian labour muted and less efficacious. Canadian labour in the industrial heartland faced a hostile state, intransigent employers and an absence of the legislative protection enjoyed by organized labour in the United States (Palmer, 1983). The greater organizational complexity of the Canadian working class movement meant that internal divisions were more salient and fragmentation more pronounced. National and regional differentiation, multiple trade union centers, bitter political rivalries among competing parties and the imposition of the most serious conflicts within the American movement combined to weaken labour's capacity to respond to the catastrophe. It was not until 1935 that the pent up desire for industrial organization broke through these barriers (Lipton, 1973). And it was not until the Oshawa strike of 1937 that a frontal assault on a core sector of the modern economy was undertaken. Despite some symbolic concessions, this strike was largely successful. Yet, it seemed to provide little impetus to further organizing drives; Abella (1973), for example, notes the virtual collapse of industrial union organizing in the aftermath of Oshawa. As a result, the Canadian labour movement was fragmented and in retreat as Canada entered World War II in 1939 (Palmer, 1983).

One positive development of these years was the emergence of the CCF in 1932-33. While the embryonic farm/labour alliance raised hopes for the future, the organized labour movement only played a minor role in the CCF of the 30s (Miller, 1971). In large part this was due to the historic opposition of the TLC to partisan politics as well as the concerted efforts of Communists within the labour movement to frustrate the ensconsment of organized labour within a Social Democratic party. It was not until the expulsion of the CIO organizations from the TLC and their subsequent merger with the ACCL, forming the CCL, that serious efforts to affiliate union locals to the CCF were made. Even then, it was not until 1943 that the CCL endorsed the CCF as the political arm of labour and formally recommended affiliation of union locals (Miller, 1971).

The depression of the 1930s unleashed a tremendous outburst of popular anger and energy, such that there was a substantial radicalization of political discourse, an intensification of social conflict and the emergence of new modalities of class struggle. Public policy became an object of class politics on a scale that has rarely been witnessed in the western world. But class politics had different outcomes. Labour in North America was only able to establish a modest level of implantation within the working class and the movements remained within political parties that proved unwilling or unable to realize labour's modest goals (United States) or were unable to win national political office (Canada). The gains that were registered only provided a limited basis for future advances and these turned out to be of relatively short duration. In Sweden the working class movement was able to achieve a measure of hegemony in the political arena and a degree of implantation within the working class that was virtually irreversible. This formative period of the contemporary working class movements would prove to be of crucial importance for their futures.

Endnotes

1. In the United States, the principal investigator was Erik Wright, and data were collected in 1980. In Canada, the principal investigator was John Myles, and the data were collected in 1982-83. In Sweden, the principal investigator was Goran Ahrne, and the data were collected in 1980. The merged multi-nation file was distributed by the Inter-University Consortium for Political and Social Research. Neither the collectors of the original data nor the Consortium bear any responsibility for the analyses or interpretations presented here.

2. In Canada and the United States, additional samples of housewives and unemployed workers were obtained; these are not analyzed here.

3. As is usually the case in representative sample surveys, most of our "owners" are in fact what would be characterized as "small employers" or "petite bourgeois" rather than "bourgeoisie."

4. While it is not possible to estimate values of individual factor means in confirmatory factor analysis models, *comparisons* between factor means across groups can be undertaken, with tests of statistical significance for these differences (cf., Bollen, 1989, Jöreskog and Sörbom, 1989).

5. Indeed, the difference between Canadian workers and the American workers is only significant at $p < .0978$ (chi-square=2.74, df=1).

6. Income was coded as the Canadian or Swedish equivalent of U.S. dollars, divided by 1000. Education was coded to a standard metric -- number of years of schooling.

7. In LISREL terminology, we assess the Gamma matrix coefficients for left party support and union membership (in two separate models), where education, age and income are the other exogenous ksi-variables.

References

Abella, Irving
1973 Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Abella, Irving (ed.)
1974 On Strike. Toronto: Lorimer.

Aherne, G and E. Wright
1983 "Classes in the United States and Canada" Acta Sociologica, 26(3): 211-235.

Anderson, Perry
1974 Lineages of the Absolutist State. London: New Left Books.

Baer, D, E. Grabb and W. Johnston
1990 "The Values of Canadians and Americans" Social Forces, 68(3): 693-713.

Bain, G. S. and R. Price
1980 Profiles of Union Growth. Oxford: Blackwell.

Black, D. and J.Myles
1986 "Dependent Industrialization and the Canadian Class Structure" Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 25(3):335-364.

Bollen, K.
1989 Structural Equations with Latent Variables. New Class Structure" New York: Wiley.

Buchanan, W. and H. Cantril
1953 How Nations See Each Other. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press.

Cameron, David
1984 "Social Democracy, Corporatism and the Representation of Economic Interest in Advanced Capitalist Society" in J. Goldthorpe, Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, pp. 143-178. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Castles, Francis
1978 The Social Democratic Image of Society. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

Centers, Richard
1961 The Psychology of Social Classes. New York: Russell and Russell.

Davis, Mike
1980 "The Barren Marriage of American Labor and the Democratic Party" New Left Review, 124: 43-84.

1986 "Why the U.S. Working Class is Different." In M. Davis, Prisoners of the American Dream, pp. 3-51. London: Verso.

Ehrensaft, P. and W. Armstrong
1981 "The Formation of Dominion Capitalism" in A. Moscovitch and G. Drover (eds.), Inequality, pp. 99-155. Toronto: University Press.

Esping-Andersen, Gosta
1985 "Power and Distributional Regimes" Politics and Society, 14(2): 223-256.

1989 "The Three Political Economies of the Welfare State" Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 26(1): 10-35.

Evans, R
1989 Albert Bandura: The Man and His Ideas - A Dialogue. New York: Praeger.

Ferguson, T.
1984 "From Normalcy to New Deal" International Organization, 38(1): 41-94.

Galenson, Walter
1986 "The Historical Role of American Trade Unionism" in S.M Lipset, Unions in Transition, pp. 39-74. San Francisco: I.C.S. Press.

Gaventa, J.
1980 Power and Powerlessness in Appalachia. Oxford: Clarendon.

Giddens, Anthony
1981 The Class Structure of Advanced Societies. Second Edition. London: Hutchinson.

Gourevitch, P
1984 "Breaking with Orthodoxy: The Politics of Economic Policy Responses to the Depression of the 1930s" International Organization, 38(1): 95-129.

Griffin, L. and P. O'Connell, H. Cameron
1989 "National variations in the context of struggle: postwar class conflict and market distribution in the capitalist democracies" Canadian Review of Sociology and Anthropology, 26(1): 37-68.

Jackson, M. and R. Tessler
1984 "Perceived Lack of Control over Life Events" Social Science Research, 13(3): 287-301.

Jöreskog, K. and D. Sörbom
1989 Lisrel 7 User's Guide. Mooresville, In: Scientific Software.

Jorberg, L.
1970 The Industrial Revolution in Scandinavia: 1850-1914. London: Fontana.

Karable, Jerome
1979 "The Failure of American Socialism Reconsidered" Socialist Register, pp 204-227.

Katznelson, Ira
1978 "Considerations on Social Democracy in the United States" Comparative Politics, 11(1): 77-99.

Kealey, G.
1984 "1919: the Canadian Labour Revolt" Labour, 13: 11-44.

Korpi, Walter
1978 The Working Class in Welfare Capitalism. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

1982 "The Historic Compromise and its Dissolution in Sweden" in B. Ryder and V. Bergstrow, Choices for Economic and Social Policy in the 1980s, pp. 124- 141. London: Allen and Unwin.

1983 The Democratic Class Struggle. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul

Levine, A, and E. Sober, E. Wright
1987 "Marxism and Methodological Individualism" New Left Review, 162: 67-84.

Levine, Andrew and Erik Wright
1980 "Rationality and Class Struggle", New Left Review, 123: 47-68.

Levine, Rhonda
1988 Class Struggle and the New Deal. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press.

Lipset, S. M.
1963 "The Value Patterns of Democracy: A Case Study in Comparative Analysis" American Sociological Review, 28(4): 515-531.

1974 "Social Scientists View the Problem" in Failure of a Dream, J.H.M. Laslett and S. M. Lipset (eds.), pp. 25-82. Garden City: Anchor.

Lipton, Charles
1973 The Trade Union Movement of Canada: 1820-1979. Toronto: N. C. Press.

Lukacs, Gyorgy
1971 History and Class Consciousness. London: Merlin.

Mann, M.
1973 Consciousness and Action Among the Western Working Class. London: Macmillan.

McLanahan, S. and A. Sorenson
1984 "Life Events and Psychological Well-Being" Social Science Research, 13(2): 111-28.

Miller, R.V.
1971 "Organized Labour and Politics" in R. V. Miller F. Isbester, Labour in Transition, pp. 204-39. Scarborough: Prentice Hall.

Nisbet, Robert
1969 Social Change and History. New York: Oxford.

Palmer, Bryan
1983 Working Class Experience. Toronto: Butterworths

Parsons, Talcott
1977 The Evolution of Societies. Edited by J. Toby. New Jersey: Prentice-Hall.

Pearlin, L. and C. Schooler
1978 "The Structure of Coping" Journal of Health and Social Behavior, 19: 2-21.

Shalev, Michael and Walter Korpi
1980 "Working Class Mobilization and American Exceptionalism" Economic and Industrial Democracy, 1: 31-61.

Soderpalm, Sven
1979 "The Crisis Agreement and the Social Democratic Road to Power" in S. Koblik (ed.), Sweden's Development from Poverty to Affluence, pp. 258-78. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Thompson, John H.
1985 "Canada: 1922-1939. Toronto: McClelland and Stewart.

Weir, M and T. Skocpol
1985 "State Responses and the Possibilities for Keynesian' Responses to the Great Depression in Sweden, Britain and the United States" in P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol, Bringing the State Back In, pp. 107-68. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Wilentz, Sean
1984 "Against Exceptionalism: Class Consciousness and the American Labour Movement" International Labour and Working Class History, 26: 1-24.

Zolberg, A
1986 "How Many Exceptionalisms" in I. Katznelson and A Zolberg, Working Class Formation, pp. 398-456. Princeton: University Press.

RESEARCH DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES

70. Unemployment and Occupational Aspirations: A Panel Study of High School Graduates.
Susan Empson-Warner and Harvey Krahn. November 1990.

71. An Analysis of Native Mortality in Canada.
Andrea Werner-Leonard and Frank Trovato. November 1990

72. Ethnic Variations in Fertility: Microeconomic and Minority Group Status Effects.
Tina W.L. Chui and Frank Trovato. December 1990.

73. Quantifying Semi-Structured Interviews.
Harvey Krahn. December 1990.

74. Sampling Methods for Telephone Surveys.
N.M. Lalu. January 1991.

75. Three Models for Macro-Simulation and Population Projection.
N.M. Lalu. January 1991.

76. Migration to Quebec: A Census Analysis of British and French Canadians, 1966-71 and 1976-81.
Manoshi Das and Frank Trovato. February 1991.

77. Adolescent Smoking Intentions: Gender Differences in Peer Context.
Erica Van Roosmalen and Susan McDaniel. March 1991.

78. Socio-Cultural Mobility Issues in Canada.
Parameswara Krishnan. March 1991.

79. Political Demography of Bangladesh: A Preliminary Analysis.
A.K.M. Nurun Nabi and P. Krishnan. April 1991.

80. Implementation of CATI Techniques in an Academic Social Science Research Setting.
Dave Odynak and Cliff Kinzel. April 1991.

81. Violent and Accidental Mortality Among Immigrants in Canada.
Frank Trovato. May 1991.

82. Seat Belt Use In Edmonton: Results From a Survey.
J. Jayachandran and P. Krishnan. May 1991.

83. Structural Equation Models of Multiple Respondent Data: Mutual Influence Versus Family Factor Approaches.
M. Gillespie and J. McDonald. October 1991

84. Women and Family in the Later Years: Findings from the 1990 General Social Survey.
Susan M. McDaniel. October 1991.

85. Population Projection by Single Years of Age on a Personal Computer.
N.M. Lalu. November 1991

86. Determination of Sample Size for Surveys.
N.M. Lalu. November 1991

87. The Three Nations of North America? National Character, Regional Culture, and the Values of Canadians and Americans.
D. Baer, Edward Grabb, and W. Johnston. March 1992.